

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Chief, Trade and Services Division, ORR DATE: 26 April 1966

FROM : Chief, Manufacturing Branch, D/R

SUBJECT: Estimating Enemy Logistical Requirements During the Korean War

1. As you requested, our recent review of the Korean Air War was followed by a look at another aspect of that conflict, the examination of various estimates of enemy logistical requirements. These estimates were made by [REDACTED] intelligence components during and after the Korean War. After reviewing these efforts we are struck with the tenuous nature of many of the numbers which flow out of such an estimating exercise, and the need to continue to improve them.

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2. Simply, the review which we made consisted of examining various total and individual logistical requirements, supply classes, the origin of early estimates, and the progress of the methodology. We have noted the fact that for lack of better data the estimating process began with the use of scaled-down US requirements and proceeded to refine these as better analysis of intelligence became available.

3. Total logistical requirements, for all classes, probably are not too relevant to current conditions in Vietnam because of the different kind of a war being fought. Some of the individual estimates for various classes of supply, such as ammunition requirements, may be relevant to today's situation in Vietnam.

4. We have not examined current estimates of the logistical requirements of enemy forces in Vietnam nor compared Korean experience with these estimates. Perhaps we could discuss this problem informally sometime soon.

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